



Potential benefits of mergers


- All kinds of efficiencies
- Economies of scale
- Preserving firms that would fail
- The list is endless ...


Potential problems with mergers


- Unilateral effects market/monopoly power of the merged firm
- Oligopoly effects concentration of a market that can cause prices to increase, either through:
 - purely self-interested/independent decisionmaking of firms, or
 - oligopolistic coordination (e.g., legal "conscious parallelism")
- According to research, five significant firms in a market tends to be enough to prevent oligopolistic coordination














Hart-Scott-Rodino Act


Per-merger filing with DOJ/FTC is required where:


- the stock acquisition value exceeds \$50M and the acquirer and target have assets or annual sales in excess of \$10M for one and \$100M for the other (either way), OR
- the stock acquisition value exceeds \$200M Amounts are in 2004 dollars.


There's a passive investor exception.


DOJ/FTC challenge


- DOJ and FTC split up merger reviews between them.
- After the HSR filing, the agency has 30 days in which to make a "second request" for additional information (15 days for cash tender offers).
 - This happens about 5% of the time.
- The agency then engages in a detailed analysis.
 - Third parties can weigh in.
- To avoid adverse effects on competition, the merging firms can offer to divest themselves of certain assets or bind themselves to certain conduct.
- Often a merger dies if the agency opposes the merger.
- If the agency is opposed and the merging parties want to forge ahead, the dispute goes to court.
- Courts tend to evaluate mergers largely by the DOJ/FTC guidelines(!).



























HHI index The agencies employ the following general standards for the relevant markets they have defined: Small Change in Concentration: Mergers involving an increase in the HHI of less than 100 points are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and ordinarily require no further analysis. Unconcentrated Markets: Mergers resulting in unconcentrated markets are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and ordinarily require no further analysis. Moderately Concentrated Markets: Mergers resulting in moderately concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points potentially raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny. Highly Concentrated Markets: Mergers resulting in highly concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of between 100 points and 200 points potentially raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny. Mergers resulting in highly concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of more than 200 points will be presumed to be likely to enhance market power. The presumption may be rebutted by persuasive evidence showing that the merger is unlikely to enhance market power.


- from the Horizontal Merger Guidelines








122	2250 pre-merger 2550 post-merger
	increase of 300
Sky Lasso wit	у
Acme Aviation Services with 15% of the market.	
The current market will go	
from 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%	
to 25%, 20%, 25%, 30%.	
Will the merger pass agency scrutiny?	







Sky Lasso with 10% of the market wants to buy Acme Aviation Services with 15% of the market. The current market will go from 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30% to 25%, 20%, 25%, 30%. Will the merger pass agency scrutiny?

It will be presumed to enhance market power. So the answer is <u>no</u>, it won't pass agency scrutiny <u>unless</u> there's persuasive evidence it won't enhance market power.

Vertical mergers

- Lots and lots of efficiencies ...
- Possible anticompetitive effects (according to the 1984 Guidelines):
 - Creating a need for two-level entry
 - Facilitating horizontal collusion ...
 - If upstream firms integrate retail, they can monitor each other's prices for a cartel
 - By eliminating a disruptive buyer that pushes upstream firms to cheat on their cartel
- "[A]ctual U.S. enforcement action against vertical mergers is nearly non-existent." Elhauge (EE^{3d} at 796)
- "[T]here is ... little concrete guidance available about the content of modern U.S. antitrust law on vertical mergers." Elhauge (EE^{3d} at 796)





